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Most countries have invested – and are still investing – a huge amount in sus-
taining the study of cultures and heritages, as a means of building towards their 
futures. The presupposition is that cultures and heritages matter for our choices. 
In this essay, I would like to consider and address some objections against this 
presupposition, which might emerge in the face of recent developments that are 
changing the shape of our societies. Globalization processes seem to have acceler-
ated in the past few years, and we inevitably live in societies which are much more 
diverse than we could have expected only few years ago. Does it still make sense 
to try to know and understand traditional cultures, when we have to cope with 
everyday problems where the challenge is to build a future together, not to worry 
about the past? Wouldn’t it make more sense to find technical solutions to the 
practical problems opened by the need to live together, than trying to understand 
each other? For example, should we not struggle to find the best possible proce-
dures to deal with practical problems, rather than spending time investigating 
our different heritages?
I will try to show that there are reasons to keep worrying about cultural heri-
tages and to try to understand and compare different cultures. Such endeavours, 
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I will claim, are not just exercises for academic life, but guide the actual, practical 
processes of development that our multicultural societies need to go through. In 
the next section, I will consider a common conception of politics, i.e. the social 
contract tradition, which seems to tell against the stance I want to defend. I will 
argue that this conception of politics opens up several problems concerning prac-
tical reason. In the third section, I will discuss the nature of practical reason and 
argue that it has some universalistic features, but also some features which link it 
to particular cultures. In the fourth section, I will show how the account of prac-
tical reason I have proposed can be used to argue that the study of cultures should 
matter for our current practical problems in the domain of politics.
2. The social contract tradition and the political role of cultures
The idea that attention to cultural heritages should be avoided in political contexts 
is typically supported on social-contract grounds. The social contract tradition 
contends that political communities are established through an arbitrary act of 
individuals, who initially live independently one from the other and who, at some 
point, decide – based on what their reasons suggest – that living together is to the 
best advantage of each of them. Hence, they subscribe a contract and give rise to a 
political society. In recent times, this view received a sophisticated and incredibly 
well thought out formulation by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971).
Rawls’ account is founded on a conception of practical reason, according to 
which reason is universal, i.e. it can choose according to criteria that apply to 
anyone, anywhere, and at any time. His claim is that we can understand what is 
best to do if we imagine what one would choose to do while standing behind a 
veil of ignorance, i.e. without knowing the contingencies of one’s own life. Imag-
ine that you do not know anything about yourself, e.g. race, level of instruction, 
wealth, social sanding, job, accepted values, all sorts of preferences, and so on. In 
Rawls’ view, from behind the veil of ignorance, we all would consider best a so-
cial setting which assumes two fundamental principles: the existence of a system 
of equal liberties for everyone, and a principle of redistribution of the available 
goods that he called Maxmin. According to Maxmin, it is rational to choose the 
outset which grants the highest possible share (max), to those who occupy the 
lowest levels of society (min). For Rawls, a just political system is one in which 
the institutions and legal settings respect the two fundamental principles. Since 
the two basic principles are universally rational and are acceptable to anyone, any 
political system which satisfies them should also be acceptable to anyone.
From this point of view, a political system is universally acceptable, since it is 
neutral, i.e. is not committed to any particular view of the good or of truth. Let us 
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recall that the two basic principles are chosen behind the veil of ignorance, where 
one does not even know what one’s conception of the good is. That means that 
the principles are chosen regardless of what one’s conception of the good might 
be. This is what makes the principles universal.
Social-contract theory offers the premises needed for an argument for proce-
duralism. Proceduralism is a legal and political theory according to which the es-
tablishment and the respect of right or fair procedures are sufficient for the legit-
imacy of a legal system or a political power. The word ‘sufficient’ is crucial. Any 
reasonable theorist would recognise that procedures are necessary. A very simple 
argument seems very compelling in this sense: without procedures, we could not 
apply the law in a consistent way, and this would be unacceptable for any reason-
able understanding of the nature of justice. Proceduralism wants to claim more: 
the point is that when the right procedures are implemented and followed, a law 
or a decision is always legitimate, no matter what its content might be.
The outlook of politics offered by the social contract tradition can furnish the 
premises for an argument to the conclusion that cultures and heritages should 
not matter in the political arena. The basic principles of a just society, as we 
have seen, are chosen behind a veil of ignorance, and that means that the person 
choosing them has no idea of what her or his cultural affiliations are. Any political 
system respecting those basic principal will be neutral when it comes to differ-
ences in metaphysical outlooks, value-choices, or cultural heritages. Institutional 
and legal procedures will be correct if they respect neutrality and follow the basic 
principles. Hence, the cultural differences among people will be politically irrel-
evant, as far as a state can implement just procedures and people will generally 
adhere to them.
The idea that a political system can be neutral in the suggested sense was widely 
criticised and Rawls himself revised his own view at a later stage (1993). The main 
stream of criticism came from the outlook which became known as communitari-
anism. Philosophers including Michael Sandel (1982), Charles Taylor (1989) and 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) complained that practical reason does not quite match 
the description provided by Rawls. The main point is: what is left of a self when 
we have hidden most of its features behind a veil? On what grounds can that self 
make choices at all, without knowing what its criteria really are? Communitarians 
generally stress the importance of communities, in building the subjectivity of 
agents and thereby in furnishing them the rational and emotion tools that they 
deploy when they make their choices. The upshot is that cultures, conceptions of 
the good and values are not politically irrelevant and political systems cannot be 
neutral. The practical reason of each person would be totally dependent on the 
culture of that person. One cannot escape the heritage of one’s tradition, since that 
heritage furnishes the very criteria that one uses to make choices.
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Someone could object that conversions are a counterexample, but commu-
nitarians reject this move: they claim that events that are commonly considered 
conversions are either led by the criteria of the original culture, and thus they are 
not really conversions, or they are irrational leaps.
Communitarians brought a new emphasis to the notions of tradition and 
community, but they did it at the expense of reason: trans-cultural judgements 
are ultimately irrational. The argument between liberals and communitarians can 
be seen as a new version of an older debate, namely that between supporters of 
the idea of a universal reason and those who support the thesis that practical 
reason is culturally relative.
Communitarian objections to the liberal conception of reason have well 
made, but their alternative view of reason is also unsatisfying. We have a norma-
tive intuition according to which certain actions are wrong for everyone, apart 
from distinctions of cultures. An example might be gratuitously killing an inno-
cent person. If someone says that one’s culture allows this, we would think that 
there must be something wrong with that culture. Furthermore, these deeds are 
usually evaluated in similar manners in cultures which are very different from one 
another. This suggests that we can nurse more hope in the possibility that reason 
might achieve universal consensus than communitarians recognise. There must 
be something wrong with their view of practical reason too.
A rejoinder to both these positions is found in the mixed proposal, i.e. a 
group of views, which support the importance of cultures on liberal grounds, 
the paradigmatic example being the thought of Will Kymlicka (1995, 2001). 
These views develop Rawls’ position in a direction which is meant to recog-
nise the importance of cultures. These positions accept Rawls’ conception of 
practical reason and his view that politics is mainly committed to granting 
the maximum possible expansion of everyone’s liberty (let us recall that Raw-
ls’ first principle of a just society calls for a system of equal liberties). At the 
same time, however, these views suggest that cultures and values are politically 
relevant. The argument starts from the recognition that in order to effectively 
exercise one’s liberty, one must be able to find, in the social environment, the 
resources that one needs. However, one’s wishes are largely culture-dependent, 
and therefore there could be no protection of liberty without the protection of 
forms of life which make the exercise of the relevant wishes possible. One could 
not chose to engage in competitive chess playing, for example, if there were no 
chess community, no chess tournaments, etc. The very protection of individual 
liberty, hence, calls for the protection and the empowerment of the cultural 
forms in which individuals want to exercise their choices. This concession to 
cultures does not risk the relativistic consequences of communitarianism: fol-
lowing Rawls, the mixed position suggests that a well-formed political system 
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will only allow in its domain those cultures which are compatible with the 
protection of the freedom of all.
The mixed position attempts to reconcile the universal and the culturally 
relative conceptions of reason. It manages to acknowledge the importance of 
cultures, without giving up the possibility that reason reaches a universal per-
spective. The proposal, however, has some problems and I will mention here 
two. Firstly, it does not really address the objection about the nature of practical 
reason that communitarianism raised against Rawls, i.e. the objection that when 
all criteria are hidden from her view, the subject isn’t in a position to make a 
choice. Secondly, the proposed reconciliation is problematic: the importance of 
cultures is granted, but the only cultures acceptable from this point of view are 
those which share the same conception of the good and the same values of the 
liberal perspective, i.e. those which would rank the protection of a system of 
equal liberties as the most fundamental principle. The problem is that neutrality 
does not seem an achievable political target. The claim that the most important 
goal of society is to put as far as possible all individuals in the position where they 
can do what they desire depends on a particular conception of what is valuable 
and good. Cultures which do not share this priority cannot simply be ruled out as 
unreasonable: a suitable conception of practical reason should be able to engage 
these perspectives too.
3. Rethinking practical reason
In recent years, debates on practical reason have made much progress, due to 
philosophers such as Elizabeth Anscombe (1957), John McDowell (1998), and 
Thomas Nagel (1986), to mention only a few names, which lie behind the re-
flections which follow. The results of these discussions offer a solution to the 
problems that both sides face in the debate between communitarians and liberals. 
In this section, I will try to show why this is so, by summarizing an account of 
practical reason which I have argued for previously (De Anna 2015).1 In the next 
section, I will suggest that the ensuing view of practical reason can account for 
the importance of cultures and heritages in politics, while taking into account the 
normative intuition and explaining how reason can have a universal value.
Practical reason has to do with choices in practical situations, hence with 
human action. An action is a doing which belongs to the agent. Not all doings 
belong to agents. If someone pushes me and I hit someone else, the hitting is 
1 The essay in which I lay out this account more fully is included in a previous volume of the same 
research project to which the present volume also belongs (De Anna and Martinelli 2015).
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something my body does, but it is not my action. Actions are doings for which 
an agent can give a reason as the answer to the question: “Why did you do it?”. 
“Why did you give money to that beggar?” Answer: “Because he is hungry.”
What are reasons for actions, then? They certainly involve facts. “Because he 
is hungry” offers a fact as a reason. But that is not enough. They are facts con-
cerning an object that the agent must see as valuable (in the example: the human 
person who is begging); those facts must involve some deficiency in the valuable 
object (the beggar is hungry); the agent must have the power to make the valuable 
object better off (I have no reason to do anything, if there is nothing I can do). 
All this suggests that reasons have an objective side (a fact) and a subjective side 
(the way in which the subject responds to the fact).
I mentioned above that we share a normative intuition. That intuition is now 
relevant again, since it suggests that not all ways of responding to a situation by a 
subject are equally acceptable. I could give the money to the beggar or offer him a 
sandwich. We would consider both these ways of responding as good. However, 
I could ignore him, and be insensitive to his starvation. Or I could respond to 
the starvation by killing him. Both these two latter responses would be wrong. 
Now the problem is: what constrains the range of viable responses to a situation?
Let us remember that we are talking about practical reason, i.e. reason at 
work in action. That means that we have to consider how normative constraints 
shape action from the point of view of the agent. From that point of view, the 
question about what the right ways of responding to a situation are takes the 
following form: “The fact f seems to me a reason to do action a, but is it really 
such?” Raising this doubt amounts to asking how a well-functioning human be-
ing would respond in the same situation. That means that normativity arises from 
the consideration by an agent of how a well-functioning human being should be 
and how she would respond to the facts of the situation.
The result we reached accounts for two features of practical reason that we 
considered above: its universality and its dependence on culture. When an agent 
wonders how a well-functioning human being would react in the situation, she 
asks a question about human nature, about what all humans are and how they 
should be. On the other hand, the agent has no other way of conceiving how a 
well-functioning human being would respond than considering examples of hu-
mans whom she has encountered and who were flourishing, happy, respected and 
appreciated by others. That means that the agent’s judgements about human na-
ture are concretely shaped by her experience of humanity and human flourishing.
It is important to stress that the judgements about flourishing and about what 
counts as successful realisations of human life that an agent gives, depend on the 
kind of human being the agent is. They depend on her way of responding to sur-
rounding facts, and therefore they depend on the form of life she is engaged in. 
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Ultimately, they depend on her “culture”. The upshot is that there is no absolute 
point of view on human nature or on the good that we can access a priori. We 
form and shape our appreciation of the good through our engagement in our 
lives. This does not mean that judgements are completely subjective or agent-rel-
ative: they are objective to the extent that they concern facts. To the extent that 
humans share a common nature, we can hope to be able to find shared views on 
what the best way of responding to practical situations are.
The view of practical reason that we have acquired acknowledges the impor-
tance of cultures for practical reasons in a similar way to communitarians. It 
claims, indeed, that only through the experience of humanity that an agent has 
in her culture, can she form a notion of a flourishing life to be employed in 
practical reasoning. At the same time, however, the proposed view follows Rawls 
in endorsing a universal conception of reason: given our common humanity, it 
is possible that we comprehend the ways that others respond, even if they are 
culturally very different from us. We can also hope that mutual recognition and 
dialogue can lead us to overcome conflicts between views, even if, of course, we 
can have no guarantee that an agreement can be reached in all situations. The 
proposed view also overcomes the failure of the mixed proposal to achieve neu-
trality: it recognises that neutrality is impossible, and at the same time it does not 
exclude a priori all cultures that do not share the liberal view on the priority of 
liberty. Liberals can hope that members of cultures which are very far from theirs 
can see the point of their values and recognise that their perspective opens better 
chances for human flourishing.
4. Practical reason and the significance of cultures
The perspective on practical reason that we have reached highlights the impor-
tance of individual features of subjects for practical reason. One responds to situ-
ations in ways which are shaped by one’s sensitivity, and one’s sensitivity is in its 
turn shaped by one’s education, by one’s habits and by the examples of successful 
and unsuccessful human life that one encountered in one’s social environment 
throughout one’s life. This means that cultures have a prior role in shaping the 
practical sensitivity of their members. In what follows, I will construe some ar-
guments that assume this premise and, by joining it with various consideration 
about the nature of cultural studies, conclude that pursuing cultural studies is 
important in the practical situations in which current social conditions set us.
The importance of history. Very often our sensitivity to practical situations is 
shaped by strong dislikes or strong predilections for kinds of situations that are 
inherited from our cultures. Sometimes these dislikes and predilections depend 
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on features, which are not essential for the relevant kinds of situations, but de-
pend on contingencies of those kinds which were typical of our past and which 
are the result of our historical evolution. Studying history may help us to recog-
nise the contingency of some of the features of these kinds of situation, which are 
relevant in triggering our responses. Hence, it is important to study history, in 
order to tune our sensitivity in practical situations. Let us consider an example. I 
will use a trivial one, in order to bypass possible interferences of disagreements in 
the evaluation of real historical cases. Suppose that someone dislikes philosophy 
since philosophers are excessively narcissistic and they always talk about things 
which are only interesting for themselves. Suppose also that one is justified in 
having this sensitivity, given the state of philosophy in one’s society. By looking 
at the history of philosophy and reading the works of great philosophers of the 
past, however, one might realise that some great philosophers of the past were 
relevantly different from those common in one’s own time. This may lead one to 
recognise that one’s response to philosophy has to be more finely tuned, and that 
one can be open to forms of philosophizing different from that typical of one’s 
culture, which might contribute to a rich and flourishing life.
The importance of literature. Literature, as a form of art, offers idealised rep-
resentations of life which highlight the fundamental values of the culture which 
produced the work and offer deep insights into universal features of humanity. In 
this way, literature offers representations of the practical sensitivity typical of its 
background culture. Such representations can highlight the profoundly human 
aspects of particular cultural forms of life, but they can also point to weaknesses 
and other dangers to human flourishing. Consequently, studying literature can 
be important for improving our practical sensitivity, for various reasons. Firstly, 
through literature we take a distance from ourselves and from our forms of life, 
and become capable of seeing them as though from outside. This experience is 
sometimes very strong and effective in pointing to what goes wrong with our lives, 
and how we should change them. Secondly, by reading literature from cultures 
different from ours, we can engage enlightening representations of those cultures 
and appreciate what aspects of human flourishing can be grasped through them.
The importance of comparative cultural studies and human sciences. Cultural 
studies and some human sciences, e.g. anthropology, seek an objective outlook 
on different cultures. Objectivity remains only an ideal, but attempting to reach 
it lets scholars and students of these disciplines to reach a position above different 
cultures, from which those cultures can be compared. Of course that position is 
still subject-dependent, i.e. it depends on the sensitivity of the scholars who out-
line it, but there is no escape route from this role of subjectivity in any science. 
However, cultural studies and human sciences can find ways to interpret different 
cultures from superior points of view, and to evaluate - from their own positions 
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– the practical sensitivities that those cultures produce. This means that these 
forms of studies make a universal exercise of practical reason possible, according 
to the account of practical reason that I offered above.
5. Conclusion
The three cases I outline above suggest that, if practical reason is what I claimed, 
cultures and heritages should still be studied, even in face of current, rapid pro-
cesses of globalization. Purely procedural solutions to our practical problems will 
not be sufficient, since humans, being endowed with practical reason, seek with 
their actions what seems good to them, that is: what they take to have reasons to 
do. There will be no peace in society, no stability, unless most members of soci-
ety can share a good deal of their reasons for action. Sharing reasons for action, 
however, requires akin sensitivities. Reflection on human life, on what human 
flourishing is, on how humans can become and develop is necessary in order 
to achieve a harmony of sensitivities. This kind of activity, however, is precisely 
what the study of culture, in all its forms, does. If we want to have a peaceful and 
prosperous future, we need politicians and administrators who have both techni-
cal expertise and the cultural background needed to understand other cultures 
and to engage in debates about ways of human flourishing. Therefore, the policy 
followed by those countries, which invest on the study of cultures and heritages, 
is reasonable.
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